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INTRODUCTION
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 19351 was designed to eliminate
abuses shown, by extensive studies made for the Congress,2 to exist in holding
company operations in the electric power and natural gas industries. The provisions
of the Act fall into two basic categories. The first requires the geographic integra-
tion and corporate simplification of utility holding company systems, with broad
powers vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission to carry out the legis-
lative mandate. The primary purpose of these provisions is to reduce the holding
company systems through national action to such size that the states can regulate
them effectively. The second consists of supervisory powers assigned to the Com-
mission over the finances and operations of holding company systems, which are
intended to supplement and strengthen state regulation. The Act is unique in
American regulatory history in that it directs an administrative agency to break
up existing business organizations and to reconstruct two industries to conform with
a pattern drawn by the legislature. It has worked far-reaching changes in the
structure and practices of both industries. This study will be concerned with the
impact of the Act on the natural gas industry, the administrative performance of
the Commission in its ground-breaking task, and the implications of the regulatory
experience under the Act for other sectors of the economy.
A. Background for Regulation
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the natural gas industry in 1935 was its
astonishingly rapid physical growth, with five times as much gas marketed in the
peak year of 193o as in 19o6. An increasingly large proportion of this burgeoning
industry was being parceled out among a relatively small number of powerful
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groups. Among the groups exercising progressively more concentrated control,
the most important were Electric Bond and Share Company, Cities Service Com-
pany, Columbia Gas and Electric Corporation, and Standard Oil Company (New
Jersey). Among them they controlled approximately i8 per cent of gas production,
56 per cent of the pipe lines, and 6o per cent of the interstate movement of gas.
Control of interstate pipe line transportation was the key to dominance over the
industry; there was no alternative mode of transportation, and in 1935 the inter-
state movement of gas was not regulated. The four giants, with six other com-
panies, controlled 86 per cent of the interstate movement of gas in I934.'
The holding company was the chosen instrument of control. It offered a rich
diversity of devices by which a relatively small investment could be made to control
a vast agglomeration of physical property and reap the profit therefrom. The possi-
bilities invited artistic improvisation: H. C. Hopson, the virtuoso of Associated Gas
and Electric, offered securities tailor-made for every kind of investor-except the
one who wanted a voice in the management of the business.4 But the finest flower of
the holding company era was the pyramid. The procedure for constructing a
pyramid was to sell the bonds and preferred stock of an operating company to the
public and to buy the voting common stock for a sub-holding company, which in
turn sold its bonds and preferred to the public and its common stock to the next
level holding company. This could go on; Hopson had twelve companies in one
chain of control in his Associated Gas and Electric pyramid.' This procedure
shifted the risk to the investing public and greatly increased the profits and power
of the control group. But it was a fair weather structure. The only wealth-pro-
ducing unit in the pyramid was the operating company; when its earnings declined,
those of the holding companies vanished. Thus it was that more than 9o electric
and gas companies were placed in receivership or declared bankrupt between 1929
and I935.6
The Federal Trade Commission's investigation of utility corporations disclosed
a number of specific abuses. Among them were substantial "write-ups," repre-
senting no actual investment, in the capital assets of companies examined, amount-
ing to 13.8 per cent of total assets of holding companies, and 14.8 per cent of assets
of operating companies 7 The practical effect of these inflated capital structures
was to encourage dubious business and accounting practices in order to maintain
dividend payments. Again, holding companies frequently exploited subsidiaries
under the guise of performing financial and management services. Most of the
services were genuine; the question was whether the holding company charged for
them fairly. Interest rates usually were high, and sometimes compounded monthly.
The compensation for management services was determined by contract between
the utility and the servicing organization, and often was quite high, "yielding a net
profit of more than ioo percent on servicing costs, and very much more in some
3 UTILITY CoPRpo, rTONs, Szr;. Doc. No. 92, op. dt. supra note 2, No. 84-A, at 28-39.
'Id. No. 72-A, at 136-154. 'Id. at 154-166.
*Id. at 154 n. 46. 'Id. No. 84-A, at 296-297.
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instances."' No competitive rates were available to operating companies because the
holding companies had preempted the servicing field.
Some specific services justly could be claimed by the holding company, but over
against them could be marshaled a formidable list of abuses. The pressure to
meet fixed charges and pay dividends on top-heavy capital structures brought a
train of evils: high rates, milking of subsidiaries, stock market manipulation, divi-
dends paid out of capital or unearned surplus, inadequate depreciation reserves-the
Federal Trade Commission listed 19 "questionable practices" which were common.
These were not considered to be just matters of poor business judgment. The Com-
mission said.'
... the use of words such as fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, dishonesty, breach of trust,
and oppression are the only suitable terms to apply if one seeks to form an ethical
judgment on many practices which have taken sums beyond calculation from the rate
paying and investing public.
B. Significance of the Act
It will be helpful to precede a more detailed examination of the administration of
the Holding Company Act with a brief summary of its purpose and provisions. The
Act applies to holding companies having subsidiaries which are electric utility
companies or which are engaged in the retail distribution of natural or artificial gas.
The express purpose of the Act is to eliminate those abuses which were revealed
by the investigations of holding companies undertaken at the direction of Congress.
Public utility holding companies are required to register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which has power under specified conditions to make ex-
emptions. The most important duty of the Commission is to require the geographic
integration and corporate simplification of public utility holding company systems,
limiting pyramiding to the second degree and requiring an equitable distribution of
the voting power among security holders. The Commission also must pass upon
reorganization plans of registered holding company systems. The Commission is
charged with the supervision of three kinds of activities: (I) security transactions
of holding companies and their subsidiaries; (z) acquisition of securities, assets, and
other interests by holding companies and their subsidiaries; (3) payment of divi-
dends, solicitation of proxies, intercompany loans, and service, sales and construction
contracts. The Commission may prescribe uniform accounts and require reports.
The Act is designed to protect both investors and consumers.
The central interest of the Holding Company Act lies in the attempt by the
public through government to work a major revolution in the structure and be-
havior of private business. This was not the first time, to be sure, that such an
attempt had been made. The significance of the Holding Company Act consists
not so much in the principles which it espouses as in the techniques which it em-
ploys. The antitrust acts had declared certain kinds of corporate organizations and
81d. at 551.
9 ld. No. 73-A, at 62-63.
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practices to be inimical to the public interest and had granted to public agencies
the power to prevent them--even to the extent of dissolving business groups and
forcing divestiture of property. But the antitrust laws stemmed from the common
law. They depended for enforcement on the policeman and the lawsuit. In practice
the courts had proved timid about breaking up established corporate structures
and organizationally incompetent to supervise adequately the carrying out of such
dissolution decrees as they did hand down. Nor have the courts availed themselves
of the services of the Federal Trade Commission to help with enforcement of de-
crees.
The methodology established in the Holding Company Act is quite different from
the antitrust laws; it is the administrative, as opposed to the common law, approach.
The antitrust laws abound in the generalities of the common law, e.g., "combina-
tion in restraint of trade" and "unfair competition." The wording of the Sherman
Act has been said to have "a generality and adaptability comparable to that found
to be desirable in constitutional provisions."' More precise definitions must
wait upon prosecutions which explore the periphery of practice." The Holding
Company Act, on the other hand, marks off a precise area of application; it gives to
an administrative agency a concrete picture of the kind of business reorganization
that Congress wishes to achieve within that area, but leaves to the agency much
discretion in the manner and degree of its accomplishment; and it gives to the rules,
regulations, and orders of the agency a validity which the appellant must disprove.
In carrying out its tasks the agency may use a wide range of tools and talents; ac-
countants, economists, engineers, and lawyers pool their efforts. An examination of
the books is as good, or better, evidence than sworn testimony. The agency goes
to court only as a last resort; its first task is to seek voluntary compliance with the
law. Further, it may make sure through continuous supervision that compliance
is genuine and consistent.
The Holding Company Act in 1935 promised a fair test of the efficiency of the
administrative process in the delicate task of reshaping a part of the economy.
The statute was clear, the Commission's power ample. The political climate of the
day supported reform, and by 1938, when the Commission was to begin serious
efforts under the Act, the Court was prepared to be sympathetic. The President
was to send to the Commission some of the ablest men to serve the New Deal.
Much of the interest in this study therefore will center in the many-fronted effort
of the Commission to refashion the industries in its charge. A liquidation pro-
ceeding to eliminate a functionless tier in a pyramid, for instance, may also be
used to improve the capital structure of an associated company. The success of
grand strategy depends ultimately upon tactics. The Commission has made progress
in its principal task largely because of its tidy sense of the relatedness of all its
actions. The principal concern of this study will be with the natural gas industry,
but it will not be possible to separate it, in many aspects of the Commission's regu-
"°Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 360 (933).
" HAMILTON AND TLL, ANinmusr IN ACTioN (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940).
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latory activities, from the electric power industry. The two industries were inter-
twined in 1935; the Act covers them both; and so a decision in a case involving one
establishes principles for both.
C. Constitutionality of the Act
It is a common experience for the administration of an important regulatory
act to be held up until every important section of it has been tested in the courts.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act has the unusual record of having effected
very wide changes in the structure and conduct of hundreds of holding companies
and their subsidiaries before the Supreme Court ever ruled upon its most important
section.
Very soon after its passage, the Act was smothered under lawsuits, despite the
assurances of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Attorney General
that no penalties would be invoked for failure to comply with the Act until a test
case brought against the Electric Bond and Share Company had been decided. The
government successfully sought to confine this case to a test of Sections 4(a) and 5
which require the registration of holding companies subject to the Act. All three
levels of courts agreed that the registration provisions were separable from the
other provisions of the Act, that they were the only provisions which presented a
justiciable controversy, and that they constituted a valid exercise by Congress of
its power over interstate commerce and the mails.'2
The Electric Bond and Share decision was decisive in putting into effect the
Act's provisions. Within a year the value of holding company assets registered
under the Act increased approximately 215 per cent.' 3 Eight years were to elapse
before the Court ruled on the vital Section ii provisions. Section ii(b) (I), requiring
geographic integration of holding companies, was upheld on April i, 1946, as a valid
exercise of Congressional power over interstate commerce and the mails; 4 and a
similar validity was attributed to Section I I (b) (2), prescribing corporate simplifica-
tion, on November 25, I946. By this time holding companies in Section ii pro-
ceedings had divested interests in 399 subsidiaries having aggregate assets of more
than six billion dollars.'
II
INTERPRETATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION II
All of the Holding Company Act except Section ii is designed to regulate the
future activities of companies subject to the Act; Section ii directs the Commission
to undo what is already done. Section ii(a) requires the Commission to study
every holding company system to determine what may be done to it to reshape it
to fit the purposes of the Act. Section Ii (b) (I) directs the Commission to reduce
'2 SEC v. Electric Bond & Share Co., i8 F. Supp. 131 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), afl'd, 92 F. 2d 58o
(2d Cir. 1937), afl'd, 303 U. S. 409 (1938).
%a4 SEC ANN. REP. 6-8 (1938).
"North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686 (1946).
1r American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90 (1946).
16 12 SEC ANN. REP. 47 (1946).
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holding company systems to one or more integrated systems and to such additional
businesses as may be reasonably incidental or economically necessary or appropriate
to the operations of the integrated systems. Section ii(b) (2) requires elimination
of unnecessary complexities in corporate structures of holding company systems and
the redistribution of voting power fairly and equitably among their security holders.
Pyramiding to the second degree is established as the extreme limit of complexity
of corporate structures. The other provisions of the Section are related to the
carrying out of the requirements of Section ii(b). Section xi(e) provides that
any registered holding company or any subsidiary of such a company may sub-
mit a plan to the Commission, for its approval, in voluntary compliance with the
requirements of Section ii(b). Section it(f) requires that reorganization plans
of registered holding companies or subsidiaries under consideration in federal courts
be approved by the Commission before becoming effective.
A. Some Interpretations
A proviso to Section xi (b) (i_ allows a holding company to continue to control
one or more additional integrated public-utility systems if each meets three require-
ments: (A) it cannot be operated as an independent system without the loss of sub-
stantial economies secured by holding company control; (B) all systems are located
in one state or adjoining states, or in contiguous foreign country; and (C) the com-
bination is not so large as to impair the advantages of localized management,
efficient operation, or the effectiveness of regulation. Columbia Gas and Electric
Co. sought to retain both gas and electric utilities as components in a single integrated
system, declining to present evidence that either met the standards for retention of an
additional system. The Commission held that one must be designated as the
holding company's integrated system; the other may be kept then only if it qualifies
as an additional system.'7 In an earlier case, an electric system had been permitted
to retain a gas utility system that was small enough to qualify.' The Commission
rejected a "two area" interpretation of clause (B) offered by a holding company
which argued for retention of two integrated systems, one in Virginia and North
Carolina and the other in Texas and Louisiana, on the ground that each was located
in a single state and states adjoining it. Interpreting the ambiguous clause in the
light of Congressional intent reflected in the whole Act, the Commission held that
the fashioning of compact systems susceptible of localized management and control
required that additional systems be located in the same or adjoining states with
the company's principal integrated system?
In two decisions involving an electric power holding company, the Commission
approved as a single integrated system properties serving an area of about 90,000
square miles, but refused to allow the system to expand.20 Thus the Commission
8 S.E.C. 443 (194). See also the appendix to United Gas Improvement Co., 9 SE.C. 52, 77
(1x4).
"S American Waterworks & Electric Co., 3 S.E.C. 76 (x938).
"hEngineers Public Service Co., 9 S.E.C. 764 (94).
"
0 American Gas & Electric Co., 21 S.E.C. 575 (1945), 22 S.E.C. 808 (1946).
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made clear that mere size, per se, would not bring condemnation upon a system, but
that what it would permit to survive it might not allow to develop.
A holding company system may also retain "such other businesses as are reason-
ably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate" to its operations. The
Commission has required the holding company to show that non-utility properties
have a distinct functional relationship to its principal business.2 ' Thus one com-
pany was allowed to retain a coal company whose mines were used to supply a
subsidiary utility, and an eleven mile railroad used to transport the coal to the
utility; but a coal mine whose output had not been used by a system utility in 35
years was ordered divested.2 The miscellaneous character of the holdings of some
systems is indicated by other divestments of the same company, which included
parking lots and gas stations, a warehouse, and an amusement park. Arguments
based on long association, profitability of interconnection, economies from joint
personnel, etc. were not acceptedV3 A contemplated future functional relationship,
however, has been held to be enough 4 The Commission has declined to accept a
distinction between "investments" and properties which were "operated" by the
holding company 5 A second general requirement is that the holding company
make an affirmative showing that consumer rates will be favorably affected by the
retention of non-utility properties.2 6
B. Corporate Reorganizations
It was inevitable that many companies subject to the Act should have to under-
go reorganization, some to meet the requirements of Section ii, others to obtain
Commission approval of securities issues, and still others because the financial con-
dition of the company left no alternative. The latter reason is significant: many
reorganization proceedings under Section ii would have been mandatory in some
form in any event to restore the financial health of the corporations involved. Be-
tween September, 1929 and April, 1936, 53 utility holding companies and 36 utility
subsidiaries went into receivership or bankruptcy. During the same period, 23
holding companies and 16 operating companies defaulted on interest and offered
readjustment plans2 7 The statistics on arrearages in preferred stock dividends were
equally depressing 2
No reorganization of a company subject to the Act can escape the surveillance
of the CommissionY° A corporate reorganization is a delicate and complex under-
taking, frequently involving responsibility to thousands of persons who are unable
"United Gas Improvement Co., 9 S.E.C. 52 (94), aff'd, 138 F. 2d soxo (3d Cir. 1943).
22 The North American Co., II S.E.C. 194 (1942).
'
2 1d. at 212-13.
"' Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. SEC, 17o F. 2d 453 (8th Cir. 1948).
"2United Gas Improvement Co., supra note 21.
25 North American Co., supra note 22, at 220.
27 so SEC ANN. REP. 86-87 (1944).
" 6 SEC ANN. REP. 40-41 (940).
2D North American Co. sought to dissolve a subsidiary in a Delaware court, but submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Commission when the latter sought a federal injunction against the effectuation of
the plan. 9 S.E.C. 617 (94i).
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adequately to defend their rights. For this reason, the Act provides that both the
Commission in approving and the district court in enforcing an ix(e) or ii(f) plan
must find not only that it is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of Section ix but
that it is "fair and equitable to persons affected by such plans." This section of
this paper will discuss interpretations of the terms "fair and equitable" which, in
determining the respective rights of investors, have had the effect of increasing the
fiduciary responsibility of holding companies for their management of their subsidi-
aries' affairs.
One such interpretation concerned the status to be granted to an intercompany
debt claim in a reorganization proceeding. Ordinarily, a debt claim enjoys priority
over the claims of any class of stock, but where it had been contracted by a subsid-
iary in a transaction with its parent not conducted at arm's-length, it was subject to
question. When confronted with claims built up through some process of "milking"
the subsidiary, the Commission has followed the "Deep Rock" principle established
by the Supreme Court.3° The principle is that a parent corporation may not par-
ticipate on the same basis as the public security holders in the reorganization of a
subsidiary when it has been guilty of mismanagement or of unfairness to the sub-
sidiary, but must subordinate its debt claims against the subsidiary to the claims of
publicly held preferred stock. In practice, this has meant that the validity of the
parent's debt claim and its right to priority must be determined in each case upon
its merits.3 ' An effort in 1941 to formulate a general rule was unsuccessful. "
The other interpretations of the words "fair and equitable" in reorganization
plans that are important are those concerning the priorities to be assigned to the
rights of various groups of security holders to participate in the new company. In
early cases the Commission followed the doctrine of North Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, de-
cided in 1913, that the assets of an estate must be divided among security holders,
as far as they will go, in accordance with their contract rights and priorities8 3  The
strict adherence to contractual priorities followed in these cases, 4 in which re-
organizations under the Bankruptcy Act were reviewed pursuant to Section ix(f)
of the Holding Company Act, has been modified by a distinction which the Com-
mission now makes between equity receiverships and certain kinds of ii(e) re-
"°Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939).
1 In Pepper v. Litton the Court said: "The essence of the test is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity
will set it aside." 308 U. S. 295, 3o6-307 (939). Cf. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 32
U. S. 510 (1941).
27 SEC ANN. REp. io8-iog (941). For representative cases, see Mountain States Power Co., 5
S.E.C. 1 (I939); Gulf Public Service Co., 7 S.E.C. io26 (1940); Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
8 S.E.C. 271 (1940); Georgia Power Co., 8 S.E.C. 656 (941); and Empire Fuel & Gas Co., xi S.E.C.
943 (1942).
"3 228 U. S. 482; accord, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 308 U. S. xo6 (1939).
Cf. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, supra note 31.
"'United Telephone & Electric Co., 3 S.E.C. 653 (1938); West Ohio Gas Co., 3 S.E.C. 1014 (938);
Mountain States Power Co., 5 S.E.C. 1 (i939); United Light & Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 1 (1943), afL'd
in Otis & Co. v. SEC, 142 F. 2d 411 (3 d Cir. 1944), af'd, 323 U. S. 624 (1945).
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organizations. If the appropriate order which the Commission must issue under
Ix(b) is to liquidate, the ii(e) plan is a substitute for liquidation; it is essentially
the same proceeding as that under the Bankruptcy Act or an earlier equity pro-
ceeding, and liquidation preferences should be followed strictly. But if the appropri-
ate order does not require liquidation, but reorganization to conform with ii(b)
requirements, the context is different: liquidation is not "in the air" and the con-
tractual rights of various classes of security holders are not the same as if liquida-
tion were imminent. If a class of common stock has reasonable expectation of par-
ticipation in future earnings if the corporation were left undisturbed, it has a right
to participate in the reorganization. If it has no such reasonable expectation, it
may be extinguished without compunction. The principle is that "fair and equitable
plans should not cause any class of securities to sacrifice valuable rights and confer
a windfall on another class." 6 The principle is applied also in the Commission's
refusal to approve the payment of redemption premiums on bonds and debentures
when to comply with Section ii it is necessary to eliminate or reduce debt. Since
the retirements are not voluntary, it is held that call premiums cannot properly be
claimed3 7
C. Impact of Section ii
Some conception of the importance of the foregoing interpretations, and of the
impact of Section ii on the industry, can be had from the bare statistics of the
Commission's performance. The Commission commenced its serious efforts to carry
out the purposes of the section in 194o, and at the end of only twelve years it
could say that the task was rapidly nearing completion. At one time or another
in that period, 2197 companies had been subject to the Commission's jurisdiction as
components of registered holding company systems, 214 of these being holding
companies, 929 electric or gas utilities, and 1054 non-utilities or utilities other than
electric or gas. By the end of the fiscal year 1952, the Commission had released 176o
companies from its jurisdiction, 761 by divestments under Section ii and the balance
through dissolutions, mergers, consolidations, exemptions, and other means. In addi-
tion to the divested properties released from Commission jurisdiction, 259 companies
(=9 electric utility, 42 gas utility, 88 non-utility) were divested from one system
in the process of integration and simplification but remained under control of
another registered holding company38 In the next year divestments increased to
812 companies with assets of $11,497,536,971, of which 151 were gas utilities with
assets of $738,I7I,238V' With the completion of its gigantic assignment under
" A full discussion of the distinction and supporting reasons is found in Federal Water Service
Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893 (31941). The legal history of reorganization proceedings is found at 904-14. Com-
missioner Healy disagreed with the majority and until his death in 1946 continued to do so.
so iO SEC ANN. REP. 93 (1944).
37North Continent Utilities Corp., 54 F. Supp. 527 (D. Del. 1944); Consolidated Electric & Gas
Co., 55 F. Supp. 21X (D. Del. 1944); Laclede Gas Light Co., 57 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Mo. 1944); New
York Trust Co. v. SEC, 13 F. 2d 274 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 786 (1943); City Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. SEC, 134 F. 2d 65 (7th Cir. 1943).
as 18 SEC ANN. REP. 82-85 (1952).
so i9 SEC ANN. REP. 53 (953).
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Section ii in sight, the Commission already had passed into the next phase, the
continuing supervision of the 2o holding company groups with aggregate assets of
over seven billion dollars that were expected to remain as permanent integrated
utility systems. Eighteen per cent of natural and manufactured gas plants would
remain under holding company control, as contrasted with 28 per cent in the early
thirties4
In its report to the Senate, the Federal Trade Commission gave significant in-
formation on nine principal natural gas systems 1 Three of them offered little
difficulty under Section ii; one already was an integrated system and the other
two soon effected mergers which eliminated their holding companies. The other
six presented problems of real magnitude. Four of them, it will be remembered
(supra, p. 456), dominated the industry. The story of what happened to any one
of these giants perhaps would be the best way to epitomize the complex history
of the Act 4 The proceedings have been long and complicated for several reasons.
The Commission will not release a company from its jurisdiction until the latter
has complied fully with the Act. This usually requires a piecemeal dismantling
of a complex structure, in order to protect the rights of all who have an interest in
each corporate entity. The Commission has been careful to avoid the wholesale
dumping of utility assets on the market, as predicted by opponents of the Act prior
to its passage. At each step of the way, questions such as those discussed earlier
have had to be answered. There is room here for only the most summary statment
of what happened to each system, but that should at least suggest the changes that
have been made.
The largest holding company system ever registered under the Act was Electric
Bond and Share Co., which in 1938 controlled 121 domestic subsidiaries, including
five major subholding companies. Three of the latter have been or will be dis-
solved. A fourth independently controls an integrated system. Bond and Share,
which is to become an investment company, retains an interest in the fifth, which
operates only in foreign countries. The sprawling Bond and Share empire has
been replaced by numerous integrated systems, including that of United Gas Corpo-
ration (which was the system's principal natural gas sub-holding company) along
the Gulf Coast in which Bond and Share now has less than five per cent interest.
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), faced with a choice between its gas utility
and non-utility petroleum business, elected to divest the former. Accordingly,
Standard's gas subsidiaries were transferred to Consolidated Natural Gas Co., a
newly organized registered holding company, in return for all of Consolidated's
capital stock, which then was distributed as a dividend to Standard's common
stockholders. Standard ceased to be a holding company under the Act.
40 18 SEC ANN. REP. xiO (1952).
'
1 UTILIrY CORPORATrONS, SEN. Doc. No. 92, No. 84-A, supra note 2, at 228-237, and maps
II-XI.
'Because of the multiplicity of orders and actions involved in bringing each system into compliance
with Section ii, citations will not be given here. Useful progress reports on each system may be found
in the Commission's annual reports.
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Cities Service Co. at the time of its registration in 1941 was the top holding
company in a system made up of 125 companies with consolidated assets of ap-
proximately a billion dollars. Three sub-holding companies controlled the 49 electric
and gas utilities in the system. Of those three, two have been liquidated and dis-
solved, and the third has divested its utility properties, remaining a subsidiary of
Cities. In the near future, Cities itself should be no longer subject to the Act,
having effectuated its plan to divest all its utility properties.
The fourth giant system, Columbia Gas and Electric Co., chose to continue as
a registered holding company with an integrated natural gas system. A system
sub-holding company sold its interest in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., and by
1946 the divestment of electric utility properties was complete. Columbia Gas
System, Inc. (as it is now named) operates in seven states and the District of Co-
lumbia, with total assets of approximately a half billion. Columbia owns all out-
standing securities of its subsidiaries, and public financing of them is handled at
the holding company level. The soundness of the system's condition was attested
by the ease with which a huge construction program, beginning in 1950, was
financed.
The other two of the nine systems described by the Federal Trade Commission
have had quite different histories under Section ii. One of them, Lone Star Gas
Corp., was the first major holding company system to comply completely with
the requirements of the section. When it was released from Commission jurisdic-
tion in 1944, it consisted of a Texas corporation engaged in transmission and dis-
tribution, with a single producing subsidiary. Approximately $2o,ooo,ooo of ques-
tionable items had been eliminated from its property accounts, and its capitalization
consisted of bank loans and a single system of common stock. Standard Gas and
Electric Co. (and its parent, Standard Power and Light Co.), on the other hand,
has presented a maximum of difficulties. In 1936 the system represented in an
extreme degree the pyramiding and scatteration of properties condemned by Con-
gress, with io5 companies operating in 20 states and Mexico, including nine reg-
istered holding companies. By the end of June, 1952, it had been reduced to thirteen
companies, of which six were utilities. Nevertheless, the problems have been com-
plex and many remain; in 1951 the Commission allowed the two top holding com-
panies to withdraw ii(e) plans approved in the mid-forties because conditions had
changed before they could be consummated, and progress is being made in carrying
out new plans.
III
OTHER PROVISIONS
A. Public Utility Security Issues
The provisions of Section ii call for the Commission to perform corporate
surgery more or less against the patient's will. Most of the other sections of the
Act outline a kind of continuing therapy designed to keep the patient well, whether
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he likes good health or not. One of the most effective of these measures is the
power vested in the Commission to control the issuance of securities by corporations
subject to the Act. Section 7(d) provides certain qualitative standards which a
security issue must meet to be approved by the Commission. Among other things,
the security must be reasonably adapted to the security structure and earning power
of the declarant; the financing represented by this security must be necessary or
appropriate to the economical and efficient operation of a business in which the
applicant lawfully is engaged or has an interest; the fees, commissions, or other
remuneration paid in connection with the issue or sale of the security must be
reasonable; and the terms and conditions of the issue or sale must not be detri-
mental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers. Section
7(g) provides that state laws must be complied with; if the Commission is in-
formed by state authorities having proper jurisdiction that they have not been
complied with, approval must wait upon compliance. An issue or sale of securities
may be exempted under several conditions, set forth in Section 6(b), the most im-
portant being that the securities are solely for the purpose of financing the business
of a subsidiary of a registered holding company and have been expressly authorized
by the state commission of the state in which the subsidiary company is organized
and doing business. But to these exempted issues and sales the Commission may
attach terms and conditions in the public interest or for the protection of investors
and consumers.
A primary objective of the Commission in passing upon declarations filed with
it has been to help companies subject to the Act to achieve balanced capital struc-
tures with a substantial proportion of common stock equity. One of the chief
"evils" against which the Act was directed was the financing of utilities almost
entirely through bonds and preferred stock sold to the public, the common stock
exercising control representing a small part of total capitalization and little or no
investment. A capital structure so composed lacks the "cushion" against adversity
afforded by a proper amount of common stock, the corporate function of which
is to absorb the losses as well as the gains. Furthermore, the rigid fixed charges
associated with debt make it impossible for the company to adapt its financial pro-
gram to changed conditions if debt makes up too great a proportion of its capital
structure.
The Commission has been interested not so much in the amount of the debt as
in the debt ratio-the ratio of bonds, or of bonds and preferred stock, to total cap-
italization and to net tangible property. It has also considered the relationship of
earning power to the fixed charges of debt and the dividend requirements of pre-
ferred stock. The Commission has sought to limit funded debt to 50 per cent of
the net fixed assets of the company, and the issuance of new additional bonds to
6o per cent of the cost or fair value, whichever is less, of net additions to fixed prop-
erty. The higher ratio allowed for bonding additions is intended to give greater
flexibility under the company's mortgage indenture to meet unforeseen future
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conditions.43 These conservative debt ratios may be contrasted with the 70 to 80
per cent of the fair value of additional property which had been customary in the
utility industry.
The Commission has not attempted to devise a rigid set of standards, but
rather to help each company to meet the requirements of the Act, using any tool
available to solve each problem in its own factual context. The capitalization of
subsidiary companies may be improved by capital contributions of parent com-
panies,44 or by conversion of open accounts and senior securities of parents into
common stock of subsidiaries (serving the further purpose of making them junior
to publicly held bonds and preferred stock) . In some instances common stock
also has been sold to the public. Where these measures have proved to be im-
possible, or inadequate by themselves, requirements for systematic debt reduction
have been incorporated in the mortgage indenture. This may be accomplished by
sinking fund requirements, by restrictions on the payment of dividends out of earn-
ings until certain debt retirement specifications have been met, and by serial
financing.46 Write-ups have been eliminated from property accounts. Depreciation
and maintenance funds have been increased to protect the integrity of capital.
Until the end of 194o, a majority of the Commission made a distinction between
a security issue for the purpose of refunding outstanding obligations at more ad-
vantageous terms and one which created new debt. The majority's attitude was
that a refunding issue which did not substantially improve an already bad capital
structure, but which reduced the interest burden and provided for systematic debt
reduction, might be justified as a "step in the right direction." This attitude was
consistently opposed by Commissioner Robert E. Healy, who believed that when
the Commission considered a declaration filed by a company whose top-heavy
capital structure reflected the kind of practices Congress had branded as an evil,
its plain duty was to require a change in the capital structure forthwith. The con-
flicting opinions were expressed vigorously in early opinions.4 The viewpoint
of Commissioner Healy was to prevail. In El Paso Electric Co! s the Commission
specifically reversed its policy, requiring henceforth that all security issues, irre-
spective of purpose, meet the standards of 7(d).
'3 7 SEC ANN. REP. 97-98 (94).
"Appalachian Electric Power Co., 8 S.E.C. 271 (1940).
'"Gulf Public Service Co., 7 S.E.C. io06 (1940); Georgia Power Co., 8 S.E.C. 656 (941).
"o Public Service Co. of Colorado, 5 S.E.C. 788 (1939). These requirements are summarized in 13
SEC ANN. REP. 89 (947).
'The distinction between refunding and new financing was made explicit by Commissioner Jerome
Frank in a separate concurring opinion in Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 6 S.E.C. 8o6, 822 (1940).
Commissioner Healy's position is put forthrightly in Public Service Co. of Colorado, supra note 46,
where, after adjusting net assets by deducting write-ups and intercompany profits, he figured that
bonds and debentures then approved, plus preferred stock, would account for ioi.22 per cent of the
company's net assets. See also Republic Service Corp., 2 S.E.C. 44 (1937); Peoples Water & Gas Co.,
3 S.E.C. 430 (1938); Consumers Power Co., 6 S.E.C. 444 (1939); West Penn Power Co., 7 S.E.C.
69 (1940).
468 S.E.C. 366 (1940). An appendix to the opinion (at p. 383) gives comprehensive reasons for
the change in policy.
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Some measure of the success of the Commission, both in achieving balanced
capital structures and in making public utility issues attractive to investors because
of the conservative nature of the underlying capital structures, may be had from
even a brief account of financing under the Commission's jurisdiction. In the
period from November 1, 1935 to the end of the fiscal year 1944, nearly 70 per cent
of the issues were for refunding, yet the Commission was able to keep the proportion
of long term debt below 6o per cent. In 1945 and 1946, many corporations which
had refunded in the early years of the Act's administration were able to refund
again, at an additional saving. With the hardening of money rates and the be-
ginning of a tremendous utility expansion program, the emphasis shifted to new
financing; in 1952 virtually all of the issues represented new money, as contrasted
with less than one per cent in 1945" Security offerings under the Act reached their
peak in 195o, but despite the steady contraction of systems subject to Commission
jurisdiction the decline since then has been slight, so great is the volume of con-
struction.5° What is perhaps most striking is the large proportion attributable to
common stock offerings, which accounted for 30.8 per cent of the total in 195o.51
Where many holding companies once financed their subsidiaries through high in-
terest loans, they now purchase common stock of their subsidiaries; and as the flow
of money from divested properties tapers off, they sell their own common stock to
the public. Capitalization of holding companies generally is limited to debt and
one class of common stock.
Requirements designed to assure equitable voting rights to all classes of stock-
holders are nearly ubiquitous in the Commission's decisions on security issues.
Most of them are safeguards for the rights of preferred stockholders, who otherwise
might be forced to suffer arrearages in dividends at no great inconvenience to com-
mon stockholders. They have been tailored to fit individual problems, but the
principal provisions may be summarized briefly."2 Upon defaults in payment of
preferred dividends aggregating one year, the preferred stock as a class is given the
right to elect a majority of the board of directors. The control returns to com-
mon stock upon the payment of the arrearages. The issuance of unsecured debt in
excess of io per cent of the aggregate secured debt, capital, and surplus of the com-
pany must be approved by a majority vote of the preferred stock. Preferred stock
must approve by a two-thirds vote the issuance of any new preferred stock with
rights prior to its own. If common stock equity is or becomes less than 25 per cent
of total capitalization and surplus, dividends on common stock are automatically
restricted. No change in the terms and conditions of outstanding stock which is
substantially prejudicial to the preferred stockholder may be made without two-thirds
approval by preferred stock. In addition to protecting preferred stock, the Com-
mission has established nomination and election procedures intended to effectuate
the will of all stockholders having a voice in control.
'9 18 SEC ANN. REP. 127 (1952). to ig SEC ANN. REP. 74 (1953).
52 17 SEC ANN. REP. io8 (195). 52 13 SEC ANN. RFP. 9o-91 (1947).
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In April, 1941, the Commission adopted Rule U-5o, which requires that securi-
ties of registered holding companies be offered at competitive bidding.' This
ended the common practice of negotiating the sale with a single principal under-
writer, who frequently was affiliated with the holding company. The competitive
bidding rule has had two clear results. One is that the cost of handling utility mort-
gage bond issues has sharply declined. The underwriting spread for 159 issues
sold in the five year period ending January I, 194o by private negotiation was
2.49 points ($249 per $ioo). In only four cases was the spread below two points.
In a similar period ending June 30, 1949, of 179 issues sold at competitive bidding,
three-fourths had a spread of seventy-five cents or less, and only eight went at
$1. 5 or more.54 A second is that a more diversified management of security offer-
ings now prevails. In the same five year period, in a study of 24 companies offer-
ing securities at competitive bidding on at least four occasions, there was only one
instance of a single underwriter winning all of a company's issues. Eleven were
handled by four managers, and eleven by three.55
In the spring of 1954 the Commission held two public hearings to consider an
amendment to Rule U-5o which would grant to state-authorized security issues of
subsidiaries of registered holding companies an automatic exemption from the
Commission's competitive bidding requirements. The arguments of proponents fell
into two categories. The first was confined to the question at issue. It was urged
that the Commission's administration of Sections ii and 17(c) (barring bankers
from offices or boards of registered holding companies and their subsidiaries) had
"immunized" the regulated companies from the abuses at which the rule was di-
rected. Moreover, the exemption was limited to issues approved by state authorities,
which would strengthen local regulation in accordance with the basic purpose of the
Act. The second category of arguments attacked the rule itself, claiming that
"banker domination" was a myth, and that without the continuing advice of the
investment banker real losses were sustained from offering the wrong securities at
the wrong place at the wrong time. The opponents of the amendment contended
that compulsory competitive bidding was necessary to preserve arm's-length bar-
gaining and free competition. They pointed to the substantial economies in financing
attributed to the rule by the Commission in its annual reports through the fiscal
year 1952, and asked what changes in utility economics had occurred since then.
In early May, the Commission had not announced its decision.
B. Service Company Regulation
A very large source of profit to public utility holding companies prior to 1935
was the performance of various services at a charge for the subsidiary companies in
their systems. To end the exploitation shown to be a frequent product of these uni-
lateral transactions, Congress provided in Section 13 of the Act, generally speaking,
" For the events and considerations leading to the adoption of the rule, see 7 SEC ANN. REP. 98-
102 (194x).
56 15 SEC ANN. REP. 88-89 (949).
"
5 Id. at 89.
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that a registered holding company could not perform services or construction work
for, or sell goods to, the companies in its system, and that the subsidiary com-
panies, mutual service companies,5" and independent companies which could do
so must comply with rules and regulations to be laid down by the Commission.
The Commission was to insure that all such services should be performed eco-
nomically and efficiently for the benefit of the companies served, and at cost, fairly
and equitably allocated among the companies served.
Holding companies accordingly terminated their services to their subsidiaries
and formed system service companies to comply with the Act. These were qualified
as rapidly as possible by the Commission, after which it was necessary to scrutinize
their organization and operations with care to shape them to the law's requirements.
The problem was that no two service companies performed quite the same group
of services and few called identical activities by the same name. The Commission
began by requiring uniform accounts and annual reports, after which, in the case
by case pragmatic approach characteristic of its operations, it had to learn enough
about service company operations to develop principles to go by."'
The most difficult problem encountered in the administration of Section X3 was
presented by interlocking officer arrangements in holding companies and their sub-
sidiary service companies. Policies in regard to the payment of the salaries of com-
mon officers varied, but in the absence of free bargaining the holding company's
share usually was quite small.-" Thus the holding company seemed to circumvent
the law's prohibition on the sale of services to a subsidiary. There was a question
also whether the common officers could serve both operating and holding com-
pany with equal zeal. Furthermore, the principal service performed was general
management, an exercise of the control function which should be paid wholly by
the parent out of the dividends received from operating company stock.
The formulation of the policy on interlocking officers began with an opinion
on Ebasco Service Company, which had been formed in 1935 to take over servicing
activities performed by Electric Bond and Share for its subsidiaries since 19o6.50
Ebasco was controlled by six directors and officers who held identical positions in
Bond and Share. The Commission ruled that the common officers must sever their
relations with one or the other company, or that their entire salaries should be paid
by the parent. Earlier decisions approving interlocking officer arrangements of this
kind were overruled as precedents. But the variety of devices employed by different
companies required individual scrutiny. One service company paid all the salaries
of officers and employees of holding and sub-holding companies on its payroll, then
charged system companies on the basis of time devoted to the service of each. The
Commission required the parent to pay the salaries of all persons whose work pri-
" The difference between the two types of companies is that the capital for subsidiary companies
is supplied by the parent company, while the capital for mutual service companies is furnished by
member companies. A holding company system may include either.
"' 6 SEC ANN. REP. 45-47 (940).
57 SEC A NN . REP. io- Iii (1941).
59 7 S.E.C. 1o56 (1940). Cf. Middle West Service Co., 9 S.E.C. 91 (94).
NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS UNDER THE HOLDING COMPANY AcT
marily benefited it.60 A similar ruling was made where common officers were paid
out of a separate "Treasurer's Account" (reimbursed by the system companies),
and a "split-check" arrangement (a separate check from each company for its
share of each common officer's salary) that was substituted for it met a similar fate.61
In requiring that several whole departments, as well as individual officers, be moved
from a service company into the top holding company, the Commission held that
it was the function of the officer or employee in question rather than the position
held or situs on a particular payroll that should determine whether he was a holding
company officer or employee.6 2 In this case the Commission enunciated the stand-
ards toward which it had been moving. Briefly stated, they prohibited the charging
of an operating company, through any device, for any part of the salary of a person
engaged primarily in the holding company's function of supervision; they barred
such person from receiving compensation from operating companies; and they re-
quired service companies to confine themselves to services of an "operating nature"
which operating subsidiaries could not perform as efficiently and economically
themselves.
The requirement that services be rendered at cost fairly and equitably allocated
among the companies served has caused the Commission to scrutinize closely the
capitalization, expense items, and cost charge systems of companies subject to the
Act. The cost of rendering service consists primarily of the expenses of the service
company, 6o to 70 per cent of which is salaries. The Commission has included
"reasonable compensation" for necessary capital as a legitimate charge on the com-
panies served, but limits the amount of capitalization to prevent the transfer of ide
funds to service companies where they contribute nothing to the performance of
services.6" Outside investments usually must be liquidated, although there are
exceptions. There is no limitation on capitalization, of course, where the parent
asks no return on capital invested in the business. Working capital is limited to
a ratio of a month's expenses. The ratio varies; usually it ranges from 2-I to 3-I64
Since the Ebasco case, the rate of return, where a return on capital is claimed, has
been 4 per cent. The general rule for the allocation of costs seems to be that, in so
far as it is possible, direct charges shall be made for particular services rendered,
with the overhead allocated as fairly as possible. The cases show a progressive re-
finement in cost allocation schemes.
It seems safe to say that the major problems in the administration of Section 13
have been solved. The Commission appears now to regard it as routine administra-
tion; not since 1944 has an annual report contained a section on service company
regulation. Indisputably, the regulation under this section has had a profound
effect on the conduct of the public utility industries. In a sense, the service com-
"United Light and Power Service Co., 8 S.E.C. 738 (1941).
"New England Gas & Electric Ass'n, 12 S.E.C. 12 (942).
" Columbia Engineering Corp., 12 S.E.C. 922 (1943). Cf. Public Utilities Management Corp.,
13 S.E.C. 532 (1943); Federal Advisers Inc., x3 S.E.C. 632 (1943).
"Ebasco Services, Inc., 7 S.E.C. io56, 1072 (1940).
"Id. at 1072-74. See also Columbia Engineering Corp., 12 S.E.C. 922, 943 (i943); American
Water Works and Electric Co., 14 S.E.C. 924, 942 (1943).
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pany racket, while not the most spectacular, probably was the meanest of the
holding company abuses; it was the fillip that added insult to injury: an operating
company exploited to the verge of bankruptcy still could be charged outrageously
for the "service." This has come to an end. Service companies now must be
genuinely useful organizations.
IV
CONCLUSIONS
The administration of the Holding Company Act has proceeded almost to the
point where the Securities and Exchange Commission can close its files on the
reconstruction phase of its work and confine itself to the continuing supervision of
those companies which will remain subject to the Act. The record of achievement,
put in the baldest way, is impressive. Holding company "scatteration" has been
replaced by integrated systems which are in the process of consolidating their single
region holdings. Corporate structures have been simplified and useless companies
liquidated. Capital structures have been balanced, debts refunded, and financial
health restored. Voting rights have been reallocated more fairly. Service com-
panies have been made a source of savings to their associates, not of profits to hold-
ing companies. Interpretative decisions, the vertebrae of any statutory corpus, have
been made courageously, in the spirit of the Congressional intent which framed tie
Act.
The administration of Section ii, as it may be epitomized in the experiences of
major natural gas systems, has resulted in: (I) the elimination of three of the "big
four" of 1935 from the natural gas holding company field; (2) the reduction of
the fourth, divested of its control of a major pipe line company, to an integrated
natural gas system in the Appalachian region; (3) the elimination of oil companies
as public utility holding companies; (4) the divorce of major natural gas and
electric power systems, and the disposal by gas systems of all electric utility holdings
of any consequence; and (5) the termination of the drift toward concentration of
control in super-holding companies.
The limitations of the Holding Company Act nevertheless should be kept in
mind. First, it is largely self-liquidating legislation. It might be compared to calling
in troops to meet an emergency: the intention is not to supersede local authority,
but to restore conditions in which it can be effective. For this reason, the Com-
mission has made full use of the provisions in the Act for cooperation with the
states. Whether the corporate practices of utility holding company systems are
regulated effectively in the future will depend largely upon the states. Second, the
Holding Company Act affects public utility companies, but it is not public utility
legislation. The Commission is not directed to establish holding company systems
of optimum size and organization, nor is it empowered to order physical connections,
nor to establish regional networks, nor to require fair rates and efficient service.
Those are tasks for public utility commissions. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has performed its task when utility holding company systems meet the
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standards of regional. integration and corporate simplification established by the
Act.
It is tempting to find in the experience of the holding company legislation a
panacea for numerous economic ills, real or fancied, and particularly for those of
business monopoly.65 But generalizing from a single experience seldom is safe. In
this instance especially, the administrative performance should not be lifted from
its historic context. The Act was championed by a popular President in an era of
reform, and the spectacular collapse of great "empires" made holding companies
vulnerable. The President appointed zealous commissioners who believed in the
Act, and by the time their handiwork reached the courts a friendly reception had
been prepared for it. Yet it is well to remember that the President got less than
he wanted, and even that by only one vote in the Senate. Furthermore, the de-
cisive acts of administration could be and were performed before time began to run
against the reformers. The passage and successful administration of so drastic an
act would seem to require a very special political climate, which does not come
often to this country. Indeed, there would seem to be few occasions requiring
government to intervene so thoroughly in the conduct of private business, in an
effort to restore an observance of rudimentary business ethics. What is salutary is
the demonstration that positive corrective measures tailored to fit the factual situation
can successfully be substituted for general prohibitions and negative sanctions.
That would seem to be the point of the experience with the Holding Company
Act, and what is most relevant for other areas of economic regulation.
" Hearings before the House fudiciary Subcommittee on Monopoly Power, Part 2-B, 81st Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1311-39 (1949). But see Trienens, The Utility Act as a Solution to Sherman Act Problems,
44 ILL. L. REv. 33 (1949). Comment, Section zz(b) of the Holding Company Act-Fifteen Years in
Retrospect, 59 YALE L. J. Io88 (ig5o).

